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Security is a fundamental requirement for all digital systems. In this paper we propose
a new entity authentication protocol, which we call the SUCI-AKA protocol. In contrast
to the existing 5G-AKA protocol, it will provide online mutual entity authentication. A
central design criteria has been to provide a solution which minimizes the system impact
and avoids hard breaks with existing schemes. The SUCI-AKA protocol is largely based
on the new 5G scheme for subscriber privacy, and integrates it with the existing 5G-AKA
entity authentication protocol in a novel way. This provides scope for accommodating both
credible subscriber privacy and online mutual entity authentication.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Context
1.1.1 Access Security in Mobile Systems
Security was recognized as a requirement already during the first generation, and successively
the security has improved over the generation. Much of the access security hinges on the “Au-
thentication and Key Agreement” (AKA) protocols. These are challenge-response protocols,
with a pre-shared secret, K and the IMSI subscriber identifier as the base credentials. The
schemes rely on pseudo-random challenges, and responses generated by message authentication
code (MAC), using K as the key. The AKA protocols include three principal parties.
 The User Equipment (UE). A proxy for the subscriber.
 The Home Network (HN). An anchor point.
 The Serving Network (SN). Where the UE is being “logged” on.
The UE consists of a subscription identity module(SIM or USIM), and a mobile equipment
(ME) device. The HN is where the permanent subscriber data is stored. The SN may belong
to the same operator as does the HN, or it may belong to some other network. If the SN does
not belong to the same network as the HN, then the SN is said to be a Visiting Network (VN).
In this paper, there is no distinction whether the SN belongs to the HN or a VN.
1.1.2 The Mobile System Generations
We have 5 generations of mobile system, with an approximately 10 year interval between them.
With respect to access security we have:
 1G - 1981: Analogue speech, digital call setup. These systems had almost no security.
 2G - 1991: All-digital, and with basic access security capabilities.
GSM was the prominent 2G system. The GSM-AKA protocol provided subscriber au-
thentication, and GSM had over-the-air 64-bit encryption.
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 3G - 2001: All-digital, and with more advanced access security procedures.
UMTS was the prominent 3G system. The UMTS-AKA protocol provided (offline) au-
thenticated challenges and subscriber authentication. UMTS had confidentiality protec-
tion (128-bit key) and integrity protection for the signalling (128-bit key, 32-bit mac).
 4G - 2010: All-IP systems, providing mobile broadband as a basic service.
The LTE systems (several versions) has an EPS-AKA protocol that provides (offline) au-
thenticated challenges and authentication of the UE. An EPS-AKA run sets up a security
context with a 256-bit master key (KASME). Sessions key are 128-bit wide.
 5G - 2020: All-IP system. A lot of new designs in the system architecture.
The 5G system provides a redesigned core network architecture and new radio (NR)
system. The 5G-AKA protocol and the associated key hierarchy is slightly more advanced
than the EPS-AKA counterpart. The (main) anchor key is called KAUSF . The biggest
news with 5G access security is the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) scheme.
1.1.3 Trust Relationship
The trust relationships for access security in mobile systems are basically as follows.
 UE-HN: Primary trust relationship.
Legally binding agreement by means of the subscription contract. The HN issues identi-
fiers and security credential to the UE. The lifetime is defined by the subscription.
 HN-VN: Primary trust relationship.
A legally binding roaming agreement covers this case. It may involve roaming brokers
mediating the VN-HN relationship. The lifetime is defined by the roaming agreement.
 UE-VN: Secondary (derived) relationship.
This relationship is established during the AKA run (mediated by the HN). The lifetime
of the relationship is limited to the lifetime of security context established by the AKA
protocol run. It may be renewed by new re-running the AKA protocol.
Note that an SN may be a VN, but it may also belong to the same entity as controls the HN.
The access security protocols are designed for the generic (roaming) case, where the SN belongs
to a VN. The terms SN and VN is often used interchangeably.
1.2 Prior Works
For the previous generations (2G-4G), there is a body of papers that propose various enhance-
ments to the AKA protocols [1, 2, 3, 4] (there are many more). Some of these papers also
address the need for incorporating subscriber privacy. There are (yet) comparatively few works
concerning 5G security. There are some papers analyzing the 5G access security, and there are
a few that provided suggestions for what 5G should have been (some prior to the standard-
ization and some later). Examples include [5, 6, 7, 8]. However, few of the proposals in the
academic literature pay much attention to the design context of the AKA protocols. That is,
the proposals tend to break with existing schemes in ways that are not likely to be acceptable,
or where the additional gains are not likely to be considered worthwhile. We thus believe that
our SUCI-AKA protocol proposal are novel in that the aim for minimal design impact, yet aim
to provide real advantages.
2
The SUCI-AKA Protocol Proposal Geir Køien
1.3 Outline of the Paper
Section 1 is the introductory part of the paper. Section 2 defines the design criteria and the
security requirements for the SUCI-AKA protocol. Section 3 outlines the 5G access security
schemes. Section 4 provides a short analysis of the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI)
scheme and the 5G-AKA protocol. Section 5 outlines and describes the SUCI-AKA protocol.
It also contains a brief analysis of the protocol. Section 6 provides a summary and a conclusion.
2 High-Level Requirements
A substantial part of the contribution of this paper is concerned with understanding the context
of the target system.
2.1 Scope
We are proposing changes to a system that is widely deployed and with billions of users. One
had then better avoid changes that break with existing designs, unless there is no other way.
2.2 Design Criteria
We approach the design of the SUCI-AKA protocol with the following design strategy:
 Efficiency is important, but it is not an end-goal.
A full entity authentication run is not a frequent event. The executing entities will
have considerably processing powers. Efficiency considerations that were meaningful in
previous generations, are often irrelevant in a 5G context.
 Minimal Impact on the Existing Procedures and System Architecture.
Design, implementation and deployment costs must be contained.
 Avoid impact at the Serving Network.
There must be changes to the HN and the UE to provide online mutual authentication.
If changes to the SN can be avoided, it will much easier to introduce the new protocol.
 Minimize impact on the USIM.
It is very costly to replace the USIM’s. It is not only the hardware costs of the UICC
hardware, on which the USIM resides, but the logistics and management of issuing and
deploying the physical cards. We will strive to avoid changes to the USIM.
 Build on existing functionality when appropriate.
In UMTS one decided that one should keep security mechanisms (from 2G) that were
needed and robust (Section 4 in [9]). We concur with this idea.
2.3 Security Requirements
The security requirements captured here are complementary to the existing set of requirements.
That is, the requirements are provided in the context of existing 5G systems.
1. Provision of online mutual entity authentication between the UE and the HN.
The UE-HN trust relationship must be confirmed. The 5G-AKA protocol only provides
indirect authentication of the HN. The UE will know that the HN issued the challenge,
but cannot know if the HN is still present. There is thus a need for online mutual entity
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authentication between the UE and the HN. The need is particularly pronounced for
initial registration at a new SN.
2. The SUCI scheme is to be retained.
Subscriber identity privacy and location privacy are essential features, and the SUCI
scheme provides this. Thus, we want to retain the basics of the SUCI scheme.
3. No changes to the key hierarchy.
The key hierarchy is deeply integrated with the system architecture. Still, it is considered
within scope to change the derivation of the anchor key material (the KAUSF key).
4. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) for the anchor key.
The KAUSF anchor key shall have the PFS property. This will not provide PFS for the
key hierarchy per se, but key reconstruction will be limited to the anchor key.
5. The SUCI-AKA protocol must be able to co-exist with the 5G-AKA protocol.
The SUCI-AKA protocol is primarily intended for initial registration with a new SN.
3 Access Security in 5G Systems
This section contains brief descriptions of the 5G access security procedures. We limit ourselves
to the identity presentation, entity authentication procedures and the generation of security
context key material (or keys). We will strive to keep the discussion generic, and avoid system
specific details whenever possible. As mentioned, the 5G system is designed to be compatible
with the 4G system, but not with 2G or 3G systems. However, the 4G and 5G AKA protocols
are derived from the UMTS-AKA protocol, and the USIM is essentially still a 3G USIM. In
addition, the basic subscriber identifiers (IMSI and TMSI) originate with 2G (GSM).
3.1 Subscriber Identification and Associated Identifiers
3.1.1 The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
The IMSI identifier is described in Section 2 in TS 23.003 [10]. It is consists of a Mobile Country
Code (MCC), a Mobile Network Code (MNC) and the Mobile Subscriber Identification Number
(MSIN). The IMSI is globally unique and is permanently stored on the UE and at the HN.
IMSI = MCC||MNC||MSIN
The IMSI is one of the possible instantiations of the SUPI identifer (see below).
3.1.2 The Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier (TMSI)
The TMSI is a 2G and 3G temporary identifier. It has local significance at the SN, and is a
32-bit wide unstructured variable. It is assigned to the UE when encryption has commenced.
Subsequently, the TMSI is use in plain-text form as the UE identifier. This provides for a
measure of subscriber privacy, with the caveat that the IMSI would have to be presented in
plain-text over-the-air prior to assignment of TMSI. For TMSI to be useful with respect to
privacy, it must be unlinkable. There are no standardized requirements to enforce this.
3.1.3 The Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity (GUTI)
There are GUTIs defined for 4G and for 5G (Section 2 in TS 23.003 [10]). The GUTIs are
compound identifiers, which encapsulate a TMSI with additional addressing information. The
M -TMSI (4G) and 5G-TMSI are similar to the 2G/3G TMSI. All TMSIs are 32-bit wide.
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3.1.4 The Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI)
The SUPI is described in Section 2 in TS 23.003 [10]. The globally unique SUPI is either
an IMSI, a Network Access Identifier (NAI), a Global Cable Identifier or a Global Line
Identifier. An exposed SUPI will compromise identity privacy, as well as permitting unsolicited
positioning and tracking.
3.1.5 The Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI)
The SUCI, see Figure 1, is the concealed correspondent identifier to the SUPI. It is described
Figure 1: The SUCI (Transposed from TS 23.003)
in Section 2 in TS 23.003 [10]. It includes various parameters, including a HN identifier, a HN
public key, a protection scheme identifier and the concealed SUPI (Scheme Output).
3.2 Subscriber Privacy Prior to 5G
Prior to 5G, the only mechanisms was the above mentioned TMSI scheme. The TMSI scheme
suffers from the fact that the UE initially have to provide the IMSI in plain-text over-the-air.
Furthermore, the SN can request the UE to provide the IMSI (in plain-text).
3.3 Identity Presentation with the SUCI Scheme
The initial identity presentation in 2G-4G is necessarily by means of the permanent IMSI
identifier. With 5G, the initial identity presentation to a SN is by means the SUCI identifier.
Subsequent identification is preferably by means of the 5G−GUTI identifier As depicted in
Figure 1, the SUCI includes a HN identifier, a HN public key, a protection scheme identifier
and the concealed SUPI (Scheme Output).
3.3.1 The use of ECIES in the SUCI Scheme
The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is the main building block of the
SUCI scheme. ECIES is a hybrid scheme and configurable cryptographic framework. It includes
an elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (DH) exchange, symmetric key derivation and symmetric key
encryption- and message authentication. A useful survey of ECIES can be found in [11].
The SUCI scheme is depicted in Figure 2 (UE viewpoint). The UE must have obtained
a suitable EC public key from the HN prior to the exchange. The sequence starts with the
UE generating a corresponding ephemeral key-pair. This key-pair is used to compute a DH
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Figure 2: The SUCI Procedure (at the UE) (Transposed from TS 33.501, Annex C.3)
secret, which is then used to derive a confidentiality key and an integrity key. These are used
to protect the message (the SUPI). The protected message and the UE’s ephemeral public key
is forwarded to the HN (there may be other data included in the message). The HN, using the
received public key, computes the DH secret, and decrypts and checks the SUPI.
3.4 The UMTS-AKA Protocol
The UMTS-AKA protocol was devised for use with 3G networks. The UMTS-AKA challenge-
response scheme is essentially embedded in the 5G-AKA protocol. This complicates the 5G-
AKA protocol, but also allows the USIM to be retained.
The UMTS-AKA protocol provides authentication of the UE and an authenticated challenge
[12]. Prior to running the challenge-response procedure, the SN will request the HN for an
authentication vector (AV ). The HN may provide up to 5 AV s in one exchange. We have:
AV = {RAND: 128-bit pseudo-random challenge
AUTN: 64-bit Authentication Token. AUTN: (AMF,SQN, MAC-A)
CK: 128-bit confidentiality key
IK: 128-bit integrity key
XRES: 64-bit signed response value}
The AUTN consists of an authentication management field (AMF ), a sequence number (SQN)
and a MAC−A value to verify the authenticity of the challenge. The UE will terminate the
AKA run if the MAC−A check fails, while providing failure indication to the SN. The UE will
trigger a re-synchronization procedure if SQN is invalid.
The UMTS-AKA protocol (abridged and simplified):
1. UE→SN: RequestAccess(IMSI)
2. SN→HN: RequestAV(IMSI)
3. HN→SN: ProvideAV(n ·AV )
4. SN→UE: Challenge(RAND,AUTN)
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5. UE: Check the MAC-A. Verify validity of SQN .
6. UE→SN: Response(RES)
The SN considers the authentication successful if (RES = XRES). The prefix X denotes
expected value). The only difference between an X and a non-X response is the vantage
point. The HN is never informed of successful outcome, but may optionally be informed if
authentication fails. The identifier in step 1 may be a TMSI. The are several cryptographic
functions defined for the UMTS-AKA protocol (see TS 33.105 (cryptographic requirements)





There is a lot more to be said about UMTS access security. The interested reader is referred
to [14, 15] for more on UMTS access security.
3.5 The 5G-AKA Protocol
The primary 5G security specifications is TS 33.501 “Security architecture and procedures for
5G System” [16]. TS 33.501 is not the most eloquent of documents, and we advocate having
a look at the tutorial paper “3GPP 5G Security” [17]. The 5G architecture is defined in TS
23.002 [18]. The subscription authentication shared secret K is stored at the UE and HN. We
note that the 5G-AKA protocol encapsulate the basics of the UMTS-AKA challenge-response.
That also means that the UMTS-AKA functions are part of the 5G-AKA protocol. There is a
5G Authentication Vector (AV), which is defined as follows:
5G−AV = {RAND,AUTN,KAUSF , XRES∗}
The RAND is the (pseudo) random challenge from the HN to the UE, and the AUTN is an
authentication token. These are essentially the same as for the UMTS-AKA protocol. The
UMTS-AKA protocol had a RES element, which was the response to the challenge. In 5G,
the RES is not used directly. Instead, an XRES∗ is derived from RES. The derivation is
defined in TS 33.501 (in Annex A.4 in [16]). There are several similar key derivations defined
in Annex A in TS 33.501. The cryptographic function used is HMAC-SHA256 (see Annex B.2
in TS 33.220 [19]).
A.4 : Res∗(CK||IK)(FC,P0, L0, P1, L1, P2, L2) (1)
Where:
 FC: Function code (0x6B)
 P0: SN-name, and L0 is the length
 P1: RAND, and L1 is the length
 P2: RES (or XRES), and L2 is the length
The 256-bit wide KAUSF is derived from the CK and IK keys, with K as the controlling
key (see Annex A.2 in TS 33.501 [16]). The CK, IK key pair originate with the UMTS-AKA
protocol. The KAUSF is an anchor key (HN/UE-side). There are also a KSEAF anchor key
(SN/UE-side) (Annex A.6 in TS 33.501 [16]). The anchor keys are key-deriving keys, and they
belong to a corresponding security context. Figure 3 shows an outline of the 5G-AKA protocol
with the main network functions.
Note that:
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 AUSF is the security anchor network function within the HN.
 SEAF is the security anchor function at the SN. AMF is an associated SN function.
 UDM, ARPF and SIDF are HN functions that aid the AUSF in 5G-AKA processing.
The baseline 5G-AKA protocol is fairly similar to the 4G EPS-AKA protocol. The 5G key
hierarchy and the security contexts are different from their 4G counterpart, but the overall
structure is the same. However, the 5G-AKA does have some significant new features:
 The HN is online during 5G-AKA execution.
 Both the SN and the HN verifies the 5G-AKA response from the UE.
 The HN only processes authentication requests from authorized networks.
 The HN does not provide KSEAF or SUPI to the SN until the UE been authenticated.
 All authentication results are logged at the HN (by the UDM network function).
 An “Anti-Biding down Between Architectures (ABBA)” feature (not discussed further).
Figure 3: Outline of 5G-AKA (w/SUCI))
3.5.1 The 5G Security Contexts and Key Hierarchy
The 5G key hierarchy is larger than the 4G key hierarchy. There are HN-UE specific security
contexts in addition to various SN-related security contexts. We shall not go into the details of
these security contexts or the associated keys, suffice to say that whole hierarchy is based on the
(CK, IK) keys. That is, the foundation of 5G-AKA is still based on the UMTS cryptographic
functions. The basis for the CK, IK key-pair is still the 128-bit pre-shared symmetric key K.
This is a pragmatic solution, and it avoid the costly logistics in replacing billions of already
distributed USIM card. Please refer to Section 6.2 in TS 33.501 [16] for a complete account.
3.5.2 Alice-Bob outline of the 5G-AKA Protocol
The following is an outline of the 5G-AKA protocol. The UE identifier is either a SUCI
or a 5G−GUTI. We have simplified the exchange to enhance readability. We focus on the
principals, but also need to take the network functions into account.
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— Initial phase: Initialization and Identity presentation
1. UE: Generate SUCI.
UE→SN: N1-message(SUCI)
2. SN→HN: UEAuth AuthRequest(SUCI, SN-name)
3. HN: De-conceal SUPI. Select auth.method.
— Main phase: The 5G-AKA sequence
4. HN.UDM/ARPF: Generate 5G−AV .
5. HN: UDM/ARPF→AUSF: UEAuth GetResponse(5G−AV ,SUPI)
6. HN.AUSF:
- A.5(RAND,XRES∗)→ HXRES∗ (Annex A.5 [16])
- A.6KAUSF (FC, SN−name,Len(SN−name)→ KSEAF (Annex A.6 [16])
7. HN.AUSF→SN.SEAF: UEAuth AuthResponse(RAND,AUTN,HXRES∗)
8. SN.SEAF→UE: NAS AuthReq(RAND,AUTN)
9. UE: Compute “UMTS-AKA” part at USIM. ME computes non-3G parts.
- UE.USIM: Verify AUTN (“UMTS-AKA”: AV authenticity and sequence validity).
- UE.ME: Compute RES and RES∗.
10. UE→SN.SEAF: NAS AuthResp(RES∗)
11. SN.SEAF: Verify UE response
- A.5(RAND,RES∗)→ HRES∗.
- UE is deemed to be authenticated by SN.SEAF iff (HRES∗ = RES∗).
12. SN.SEAF→HN.KAUSF: UEAuth AuthRequest(RES∗)
13. HN.AUSF: Successful UE authentication iff: (RES∗ = XRES∗). Log the result.
14. HN.AUSF→SN.SEAF: UEAuth AuthResponse(SUPI,KSEAF )
Subsequent to the 5G-AKA sequence, the SEAF and the AUSF has the necessary security
context key material (KSEAF and (KAUSF ) respectively), and both has assurance of the UE.
The UE, on the other hand, cannot truly know that the HN is online. It has assurance that
the challenge was computed by the HN, and it has assurance that the challenge was computed
for use with the specific SN.
4 Brief Analysis of SUCI and the 5G-AKA Protocol
The following is a brief analysis of the SUCI scheme and the 5G-AKA protocol. We relate the
analysis to the requirements identified in Section 2.
4.1 Properties of the SUCI Scheme
The use of ECIES in the SUCI scheme provides confidentiality protection of the SUPI. The
ECIES construction is well-understood and in widespread use. The HN will be able to de-
conceal the SUPI, and the SUPI is not disclosed to the SN until after successful 5G-AKA
verification. The SUCI scheme is needed, and it is clearly also an effective solution. Note that
the SN plays no part in the SUCI scheme except to forward the SUCI.
Use of the SUCI scheme is a matter of policy (decided by the HN). While SUCI is mandatory
for use, the UE may optionally use the NULL scheme, which renders the effort futile. Extended
use of 5G-GUTI would also weaken the privacy.
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4.2 Improvements in the 5G-AKA Protocol
The 5G-AKA provides several useful improvements over the EPS-AKA, most of which is listed
in Section 3.5. We have not fully explained the 5G-AKA response scheme, with two-hashed
variant of the RES. This scheme permits improved verification of the UE towards the HN and
the SN. However, these improvements does not address UE beliefs in the HN or the SN.
4.3 Concerns with the 5G-AKA Protocol
4.3.1 Omissions in the 5G-AKA Protocol
The lack of explicit mutual entity authentication between the UE and the HN is an obvious
omission. Likewise, the lack of the perfect forward secrecy property. That is, it is possible to
regenerate the anchor key, KAUSF (and the associated key hierarchy), if an entity has obtained
the authentication secret K.
4.3.2 Complexity Concerns
We have only skimmed the surface of all the 5G-AKA protocol. And, we have not even men-
tioned the 4G-5G interworking parts, with context mapping, etc. Then there is the key hierar-
chy, which is also quite complex. The key derivations are mostly trivial per se, but the overall
complexity is daunting. One may therefore argue that the 5G-AKA protocol is unnecessarily
complex, and that it is difficult to verify that the design is correct. While this is a valid con-
cern, we are even more concerned about the implementations of the 5G-AKA protocol. Minor
misunderstandings could all too easily lead to implementation errors.
5 The SUCI-AKA Protocol Proposal
The SUCI-AKA protocol is proposed in the context defined by the 5G system architecture, and
by the constraints of the design criteria and security requirements defined in section 2.
5.1 The Integration of SUCI in the SUCI-AKA Protocol
We want to utilize the SUCI scheme to provide a SUCI-AKA challenge mechanism for us.
Specifically, we require:
 The UE must be able to configure SUCI to indicate the SUCI-AKA protocol.
 The UE need to provide a challenge to the HN.
 The HN/UE must be able to use the EC DH secret as the basis for KAUSF
 The existing SUCI scheme functionality should not be changed.
5.1.1 Using the Protection Scheme Identifier to Indicate the SUCI-AKA Protocol
The UE will need to indicate to the HN that it wants to trigger a SUCI-AKA protocol run.
One possible way to do this is to used the existing ECIES profile parameter. Annex C in TS
33.501 [16] describes the current ECIES profiles (Null, A or B). The profile used is encoded in
the SUCI in the Protection Scheme Identifier sub-field.
We therefore propose to create a new profile, called Profile C. The specifics of Profile C is
not important per se, but we want it to be used to indicate that the SUCI procedure is part of
the SUCI-AKA protocol. Profile C may otherwise be similar to either profile A or B. The UE
can then trigger the SUCI-AKA protocol by invoking a SUCI procedure with Profile C.
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5.1.2 The Need for a Challenge
We want to design a double challenge-response scheme, and then we need to have a challenge
from the UE to the HN. The challenge may be a pseudo-random number, but the essential
attributes are that it needs to be unpredictable, fresh and unique.
5.1.3 The Ephemeral ECIES Key-Pair
Let us denote the UE key-pair as (U, u), where U is the public key and u the private key.
Correspondingly, the (long-term) HN key-pair is denoted (H,h). The ephemeral public key from
the SUCI scheme is known to the UE to be fresh. It must also be unique and unpredictable,
otherwise it would be a very poor key. That is, U has the properties required for a challenge.
We shall not go into a cryptographic analysis of the properties of U . Suffice to say that if the
key-pair (U, u) is predictable, then the security of ECIES is compromised. The U is ephemeral,
generated on demand and used only once. Thus, uniqueness should be easily attained.
5.1.4 Overloading the Ephemeral Public Key
Within a SUCI identifier, the U is encoded in the Scheme output field. Specifically, U is
found in the sub-field ECC ephemeral public key. Thus, the SUCI scheme already provides
us with “challenge” candidate. This is fortunate, since we then also have a suitable mechanism
to forward the challenge to the HN. We note that the U is encoded as either a 256-bit or 264-bit
field. It is thus larger than the RAND issued by the HN in the 5G-AKA protocol. The response
function, which in 5G is a HMAC-functions, will work fine with variable length input.
5.1.5 The ECIES Diffie-Hellman Secret
In Figure 2, we find that the Diffie-Hellman secret is known as the Ephemeral shared key (we
denote it as epsk). It is only used internally in the SUCI scheme, and is shared between the
UE and the HN. In our design, it will be included as a parameter in the derivation of KAUSF .
5.1.6 The Existing Key Derivation Function for KAUSF
The existing KDF interface is defined in Annex A.2 in TS 33.501 [16]. The KDF itself is defined
in Annex B.2 in TS 33.220 [19], and is based on HMAC-SHA-256. The “UMTS AKA” functions
to derive CK, IK and AK are defined in TS 33.105 [13].
A.2 : KDF(CK||IK)(FC,P0, L0, P1, L1)→ KAUSF (2)
Where:
 CK, IK - Key-pair computed by “UMTS AKA” f3K(RAND)) and f4K(RAND)) function.
 FC - Function code. 0x6A for KAUSF . Defined in TS 33.220 [19].
 P0 - Serving network name
 L0 - Length of P0
 P1 - SQN ⊕AK. The sequence number (masked by the anonymity key).
 L1 - Length of P1
5.1.7 The Proposed Alternative Key Derivation Function for KAUSF
The modified KDF is modelled on the exiting A.2 function. We denote it A.2′. The sequence
number SQN is not used by SUCI-AKA, and it is instead replaced by the epsk key. That is,
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parameter P1 will be the epsk for A.2′. There also needs to be a new function code, FC, for
the A.2′ function.
A.2′ : KDF(CK||IK)(FC,P0, L0, P1, L1)→ KAUSF (3)
Given that epsk is a DH secret, a KAUSF derived by the A.2
′ function will have the perfect
forward secrecy property.
5.2 The Building Blocks of the SUCI-AKA Protocol
We now want to combine the SUCI scheme with the basics of the 5G-AKA protocol. There
needs to be some changes, but we want to keep the 5G-AKA message exchange. What we need
is to modify the 5G-AKA protocol to bind it to a SUCI challenge. We require that:
 The HN must be able to indicate to the UE that it responds to a SUCI-AKA challenge.
 The HN must provide a response to the SUCI-based challenge.
 The HN must bind the response to its own challenge.
 The UE must bind its response to both challenges.
5.2.1 Using the AMF to Indicate the SUCI-AKA Protocol
The term AMF is used to name a network function and the Authentication Management Field
(AMF ), which is included in the AUTN parameter. We here only refer to AMF in AUTN .
The AMF is defined in Annex H in TS 33.102 [12], and it can be used by the HN to configure
the authentication policy and parameters at the UE. Bits [1 . . . 7] is currently reserved for future
standardization. It will therefore be possible to use the AMF to indicate that the challenge is
a SUCI-AKA challenge if one wants to. A SUCI-AKA AMF indicator will permit the HN to
confirm to the UE that the challenge is part of a SUCI-AKA exchange.
5.2.2 HN Response to the SUCI-challenge
The HN needs to respond to the UE challenge. We can achieve this by modifying the challenge
{RAND,AUTN} to include the response. One can then create a new challenge such that:
HNChallenge : (RAND,AUTN,RESUE)
The current RES∗ response function is defined in Annex A.4 in in TS 33.501 [16]. The
SUCI-AKA equivalent function has the same layout as Function 1, but with slightly modified
parameters.
Resu(CK||IK)(FC,P0, L0, P1, L1, P2, L2)→ RESUE (4)
The SUCI-AKA equivalent parameters (only the changed parameters is included):
 FC - Function code. *** A new code must be defined.
 P1 - RAND||U . *** The SUCI-AKA modification is to concatenate RAND with U .
 L1 - Length of P1
For SUCI-AKA, there is no need for the SQN or the AMF -A anymore. If USIM modifications
is permitted, one can make the HN challenge slightly shorter: (RAND,AMF,RESU).
5.2.3 UE Response to the HN challenge
Similarly as to the HN response, we want the UE response to include the U . The simplest way
is to re-use Function 4, but with a new function code.
Resh(CK||IK)(FC,P0, L0, P1, L1, P2, L2)→ RESHN (5)
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5.3 Outline of the SUCI-AKA Protocol
We define the SUCI−AV as follows:
SUCI−AV = {RAND,AUTN,RESUE ,KAUSF , XRESHN}
The outline if for a HN-challenge that does not require USIM changes. With basis in the outline
in Section 3.5, we define the SUCI-AKA sequence as:
— Initial phase: Identity presentation and UE challenge
1. UE: Generate SUCI.
UE→SN: N1-message(SUCI)
2. SN→HN: UEAuth AuthRequest(SUCI, SN-name)
3. HN: De-conceal SUPI. Save epsk and U . Select auth.method.
— Main phase: The remaining AKA sequence
4. HN.UDM/ARPF: Generate SUCI−AV .
5. HN: UDM/ARPF→AUSF: UEAuth GetResponse(SUCI−AV ,SUPI)
6. HN.AUSF:
- A.5′ : (RAND,XRESUE)→ XRESSN (expected response to SN)
- A.6KAUSF (FC, SN−name,Len(SN−name)→ KSEAF (no change)
7. HN.AUSF→SN.SEAF: UEAuth AuthResponse(RAND,AUTN,RESUE , XRESSN )
8. SN.SEAF→UE: NAS AuthReq(RAND,AUTN,RESUE)
9. UE Verify and Respond.
- UE.USIM: Verify AUTN (“UMTS-AKA” part). Forward AKA output to ME.
- UE.ME: Verify that computed RESUE equals the received XRESUE (from HN).
- UE.ME: Compute RESHN
10. UE.ME→SN.SEAF: NAS AuthResp(RESHN )
11. SN.SEAF: Verify UE response
- Compute RESSN from received RESHN .
- UE is deemed to be authenticated by SN.SEAF iff (RESSN = XRESSN ).
12. SN.SEAF→HN.AUSF: UEAuth AuthRequest(RESHN )
13. HN.AUSF: Successful authentication iff: (RESHN = XRESHN ). Log the result.
14. HN.AUSF→SN.SEAF: UEAuth AuthResponse(SUPI,KSEAF )
Subsequent to the 5G-AKA sequence, the SEAF and the AUSF has the necessary security
context key material (KSEAF and (KAUSF ) respectively), and both has assurance of the UE.
The KAUSF was derived with epsk as one of the inputs. It cannot be derived without the epsk.
Given that the UE challenge (the U) essentially is a nonce, the UE will have assurance that
the HN is present during the SUCI-AKA protocol run. The SUCI-AKA is a “normal” mutual
challenge-response protocol in this respect. That is, one now has mutual entity authentication
between the UE and the SN. The has essentially the same assurance of the UE as it would have
had for a normal 5G-AKA run. The UE, likewise, has 5G-AKA equivalent assurance of the SN.
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5.4 Brief Analysis of the SUCI-AKA Protocol
5.4.1 Efficiency
Efficiency, as hinted at in the design criteria, is not a particularly important criteria. The SUCI-
AKA protocol is run whenever the SUCI identification is to be used. Computationally, the
number of asymmetric operations is the same as for SUCI + 5G-AKA. The other modifications
is basically only to the input to MAC functions, and these impacts are negligible.
There are some extra fields, etc., to the messages, but while this would have been important
for previous generations, the size of the messages matters little to 5G signalling. For instance,
the coding of SUCI, which contains the ephemeral public key, would not have been permissible
for the 3G/4G radio protocols. For 5G, this is not an issue.
The no. of round-trips is perhaps the most important concern, as it directly affects the
propagation delays during initial registration. Given that one for initial registration will have
to run SUCI, the number of messages and the round-trips are the same for SUCI + 5G-AKA
as it is for SUCI-AKA.
Thus, from a performance perspective, running SUCI-AKA is more or less equivalent to
running SUCI + 5G-AKA.
5.4.2 Concerning the Design Requirements
The SUCI-AKA protocol adheres to the design criteria and the security requirements found
in Section 2. It also fulfills the requirements defined in this section. But, is the SUCI-AKA
protocol secure? Specifically, we ask:
 Does it provide mutual entity authentication between UE and the HN?
 Does it provide perfect forward secrecy?
The cryptographic binding of the challenges and responses is fairly standard. The construc-
tion of a challenge-response based mutual entity authentication protocol is not new by itself.
To quote Boyd, Mathuria and Stebila (Chapter 3.6 in [20]):
To a large extent the problem of key establishment between two parties using symmetric cryp-
tography seems to have been solved.
We thus feel confident that the mutual challenge-response part is sound. The “novel” part
is the use of ECIES in the SUCI scheme, but ECIES is well-known and provided that the
ephemeral key pair really is ephemeral, there should be no problem using the U as a nonce.
The DH secret from ECIES provides the KAUSF with the perfect forward secrecy property.
The one point that may really undermine our confidence in the SUCI-AKA protocol is overall
complexity of the protocol. This complexity isn’t really due to SUCI-AKA protocol, but is
inherited from the 5G-AKA protocol. Thus, the complexity is more or less unavoidable given
our design criteria. The SUCI-AKA protocol is designed to be close to the 5G-AKA protocol,
while yet providing mutual entity authentication and sounder basis for the key hierarchy. Thus,
the SUCI-AKA protocol depend on the SUCI- scheme and 5G-AKA protocol being sound to
begin with.
Formal verification is often seen as a requirement for new protocols. And, certainly, formal
verification would seems like a natural next step concerning the development of SUCI-AKA.
However, we concur with Gollmann that proofs are a “non-goal” of formal verification [21], and
that the real benefit is to clarify the design and elucidate its workings.
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5.4.3 Limitations of the SUCI-AKA Protocol Approach
The SUCI-AKA protocol relies on the SUCI scheme and on slightly modifying the 5G-AKA
protocol. The SUCI-AKA protocol is therefore unavoidably a complex protocol, and it is not
as elegant or intuitive as it could have been for a greenfield case.
Another point worth making, is that the SUCI-AKA protocol is primarily used when UE
enters a new network. This is when the UE needs to use SUCI to identify itself, and when the
SUCI-AKA protocol is naturally triggered. Subsequent to this, the preferred identifier for the
UE will be the 5G−GUTI. These cases do not lend themselves naturally to trigger the SUCI-
AKA protocol, and extending the SUCI-AKA protocol in this direction will add considerable
complexity. On the other hand, the importance of online mutual entity authentication between
the UE and the HN is greatest for the cases where the UE enters a new network.
6 Summary and Conclusion
6.1 Summary
We have analysed the existing 5G-AKA protocol and found it to be wanting with respect to
online mutual entity authentication. The 5G-AKA protocol is a product of an evolved system
architecture and the lineage goes back to the analogue 1G systems.
A major contribution in 5G has been the inclusion of the SUCI procedure for concealed
subscriber identifier presentation. SUCI is based on an ECIES scheme, and it provides credible
identity privacy as well as location privacy for the subscriber. This is a major improvement. Cu-
riously, the SUCI procedure and the 5G-AKA protocol seems to be seen as entirely independent
procedures. Yet, the 5G-AKA will invariably be run subsequent to any SUCI invocation.
We have shown that if SUCI and 5G-AKA is seen as whole, only minor modifications is
needed to provide an integrated solution. This new solution, which we call the SUCI-AKA
protocol, provides full mutual entity authentication with only minor design modifications and
virtually no run-time overhead. We note that it will be a matter of policy if and how often the
UE should trigger a SUCI-AKA protocol run.
When the UE presents itself with 5G-GUTI, the SUCI-AKA protocol will not be run. Thus,
even with SUCI-AKA available, there will be cases where the 5G-AKA protocol will be run.
A topic for further study is to design a greenfield alternative AKA protocol. It may usefully
include the SUCI basics, and it should likely retain the HN and SN anchor keys. Such protocol
may not be realistic in the 5G context, but it may still be a worthwhile exercise.
6.2 Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that one can achieve online mutual entity authentication
in 5G by integrating the existing SUCI identity presentation scheme and 5G-AKA protocol.
The changes needed to integrate the existing schemes into the SUCI-AKA protocol are rather
minor, and that is in many ways the strength of the proposal.
A total redesign would very likely have afforded a simpler and more elegant scheme, while
achieving at least the same security level. However, our goal was very much to provide a design
that would co-exits with SUCI and 5G-AKA, and one which would accommodate the security
requirements with the least impact on existing procedures. In this respect, we feel confident
that the SUCI-AKA protocol is a worthy contribution. In short, it is a realistic design proposal
with respect to the existing system architecture.
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[8] Jari Arkko, Karl Norrman, Mats Näslund, and Bengt Sahlin. A USIM compatible 5G AKA
protocol with perfect forward secrecy. In 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, volume 1, pages
1205–1209. IEEE, 2015.
[9] 3GPP. TS 33.120 “3G security; Security principles and objectives”, Rel.4.0, 03 2001.
[10] 3GPP. TS 23.003 “Numbering, addressing and identification”, Rel.16.3, 07 2020.
[11] Vı́ctor Gayoso Mart́ınez, Luis Hernández Encinas, and Carmen Sánchez Ávila. A survey of the
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